Human Nature after Darwin by Załuski, Wojciech
Wojciech Załuski
HUMAN NATURE AFTER DARWIN
Introductory remarks
Social scientists have always wanted to believe that the social sciences are 
‘true’ sciences, just like the natural sciences. However, such a belief has nev-
er been fully justifi ed. The social sciences have usually been descriptive rather 
than explanatory, and if they tried to be explanatory, the explanatory theories 
they provided either had a low predictive power or, if they had a high predictive 
power, predictions generated by these theories rarely passed empirical tests en-
tirely satisfactorily. As a result, the social sciences possess few (if any) theories 
which can match natural sciences theories in terms of empirical corroboration 
and universal acceptance. Arguably, this mainly descriptive character of the so-
cial sciences has been due to the fact that social scientists have not had at their 
disposal a solid view of human nature. What is worse, many social scientists 
have believed that in order to work out such a view, no recourse to the natural 
sciences is needed. This belief is pernicious for the social sciences: arguably, the 
social sciences will never reach the status of ‘true’ sciences if they do not become 
open to developments in the natural (especially, biological) sciences – the only 
sciences which can provide a solid view of human nature. It should be observed, 
though, that this belief (which may be dubbed ‘scepticism towards usefulness 
of biology in the social sciences’ or, less politely, ‘biophobia’) was to some extent 
justifi ed in the past when the biological sciences did not have very much interest-
ing to say about human beings as social actors. However, recent developments 
in evolutionary biology and other biological sciences (for instance, neurobiology, 
behavioural genetics, primatology) seem to provide the underpinnings for a solid 
view of human nature, which should be interesting for social scientists and which 
should be allowed for by them in their research practice. The purpose of this 
essay is to present the main theses of this emerging view of human nature and 
the main controversies which have arisen around this view. I shall call this view 
‘Darwinian’ because its main theses rest above all on evolutionary biology and 
the related evolutionary disciplines (for instance, evolutionary psychology and 
human behavioural ecology).
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The Darwinian view of human nature 
At the outset, let me briefl y deal with two problems which one encounters in 
trying to reconstruct the biological – Darwinian – view of human nature. The 
fi rst problem is defi nitional: what is a view of human nature? The second problem 
is related to the doubt if the biological sciences can be said to imply some view of 
human nature. As for the fi rst problem: by ‘a view of human nature’ I shall under-
stand a set of well-thought out and coherent answers to the following three ques-
tions: what is the structure of the human mind?; what is the nature of human 
morality?; what is the level of human rationality? Of course, one can offer alterna-
tive defi nitions of a view of human nature. However, the above defi nition seems 
to be at least acceptable, because a thus defi ned view of human nature says very 
important things about human beings (even if it does not say all of the important 
things about human beings). As for the second problem: it should be noticed that 
no scientifi c theory directly entails any view of human nature. Rather, a scientifi c 
theory can only provide a number of insights regarding human beings. However, 
these insights can be interpreted as endorsing some view of human nature. What 
follows, then, is an interpretation of insights provided by the biological sciences 
regarding human nature. This interpretation is aimed to render extant what 
view of human nature is supported by the biological sciences, i.e. what theses 
about the structure of the human mind, the nature of human morality and the 
level of human rationality these sciences seem to support.
Question 1: What is the structure of the human mind?
Thesis 1 of the Darwinian view of human nature: The human mind is not 
a blank slate – tabula rasa – upon which everything has to be written by environ-
mental and cultural factors and can be written with equal ease: it is composed of 
built-in psychological dispositions – computational modules – shaped by natural 
selection which play a crucial role in shaping our behaviour.
Thus, the human mind consists of innate computational modules – psychologi-
cal dispositions – and these modules are evolutionary adaptations, i.e. their pres-
ence can be accounted for by the fact that they enabled our ancestors to best cope 
with the problems they encountered in ancestral environments. These problems 
concerned, in general, survival and reproduction, and in particular, for example, 
fi nding mates, succeeding in intra-sexual competition, ensuring the certainty of 
paternity, deterring the adultery of one’s sexual partner, detecting fraud in social 
exchange interactions) and thereby increased on average their chances of sur-
vival and reproductive success. It is often said that the view of the human mind 
proposed by evolutionary biologists is a form of ‘evolutionary Kantianism’ with 
regard to the problem of the existence of innate mental structures. This view as-
sumes (like Kant) that our mental structures, by means of which we grasp the 
world and act in it, are innate, but (unlike Kant) it assumes that they are not 
apriorical (and thereby necessarily identical for all rational beings), but shaped in 
the process of natural selection (and thereby contingent). In sum, Thesis 1 of the 
Darwinian view of human nature is polemical to the view (called by evolution-
79HUMAN NATURE AFTER DARWIN
ary psychologists ‘the Standard Social Science Model’ and widespread especially 
among sociologists) that the human mind is almost entirely ‘socially constructed’ 
and thus extremely malleable. 
Question 2: What is the nature of human morality?
Thesis 2 of the Darwinian view of human nature: Morality, at least in its sim-
pler manifestations, is a biological adaptation: its building blocks (empathy, al-
truistic and cooperative dispositions, moral emotions such as, e.g. a sense of guilt, 
gratitude, elementary forms of a sense of justice) are the products of natural selec-
tion. Morality is, then, deeply embedded in our nature: it is a manifestation of our 
nature rather than a purely cultural phenomenon invented in order to counteract 
our purportedly egoistic and antisocial nature. 
In order to clarify this thesis, it is useful to make recourse to the distinction 
made by the renowned primatologist Frans B.M. De Waal between two theories or 
views of human morality – morality as a veneer (the Veneer Theory) and morality 
as an outgrowth of our social instincts (the Social Instincts Theory). The Veneer 
Theory assumes that human morality is nothing more than a thin cultural over-
lay on our antisocial and egoistic nature. On this view, moral tendencies are not 
part and parcel of human nature and morality is a cultural innovation achieved 
by our species alone. Adherents of this theory were, e.g. Thomas H. Huxley and 
Sigmund Freud (especially in his Das Unbehagen in der Kultur). By contrast, 
the Social Instincts Theory assumes that human nature is social and altruistic 
and human morality is a natural outgrowth of our evolved social instincts that 
we share with many animals. These pro-social instincts (e.g. altruistic and coop-
erative dispositions, emotions that support these dispositions, empathy) are the 
building blocks of our morality. This account of human morality was defended, 
e.g. by Darwin and is defended by De Waal himself. In sum, Thesis 2 of the 
Darwinian view of human nature is polemical to the view of morality as a veneer.
Question 3: What is the level of human rationality?
Thesis 3 of the Darwinian view of human nature: Human beings are imper-
fectly rational.
Broadly speaking, there are two competing views of human rationality. One 
view assumes that human beings are perfectly rational. Agents are said to be 
perfectly rational if they maximize their utility functions (which implies that 
they correctly assess objective probabilities of their possible actions bringing 
about given states of affairs), discount their future utilities exponentially, employ 
low discount rates, and do not possess self-destructive desires. The opposite view 
says that human beings are imperfectly rational: they systematically violate at 
least one of the aforementioned conditions of perfect rationality. Now, apparently, 
the biological sciences support the view that human beings are imperfectly ra-
tional (at least in their current environments). This support seems to fl ow from 
two general and interrelated evolutionary insights regarding human rationality. 
The fi rst insight is that the human mind is not designed to seek for the truth as 
end in itself but to seek the truth only in so far as it helps to solve the adaptive 
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problems. Given that the human mind is not a disinterested truth-seeker, one 
can expect that it will be prone to generating various illusions if this is the best 
way of solving a concrete adaptive problem. For instance, a well-established fact 
is that humans are prone to self-deception, i.e. to the unconscious concealing of 
information from themselves and thereby to distorting their picture of reality. 
It should be noted, though, that the evolutionary claim that the human mind is 
essentially practical is not inconsistent with the commonsense claim that it is 
equipped with a certain autonomy and thereby can be a tool of the disinterested 
pursuit of the truth and motivate us to take actions that oppose the imperatives 
of evolution – survival and reproduction. The second insight, related to the fi rst 
and more directly relevant for the question about the level of human rationality, 
is the adaptive-lag hypothesis (called also ‘the hypothesis of time-shifted rational-
ity,’ or ‘the hypothesis of mismatch’). The hypothesis says that our psychological 
mechanisms, which were adaptive in ancestral environments (in which our psy-
chological dispositions were being shaped), will frequently lead to maladaptive 
behaviours in our current environments, which are in many respects different 
from the ancestral environments. The mismatch between biological adaptations 
of organisms and later environments in which these adaptations have to operate 
is conceivable in all animals but it is particularly sharp in the case of humans be-
cause we have psychological mechanisms that were shaped for hundreds of thou-
sands of years in ancestral environments and have not changed essentially since 
then. On the other hand, cultural evolution – a typically human process, made 
possible by our highly-developed brains – causes very considerable changes in our 
environments, making them look essentially different from ancestral environ-
ments. This hypothesis explains, for instance, why we often employ unreasonably 
high discount rates. We tend to do so because in ancestral environments steep 
discounting usually brought about much higher payoffs than the discounting we 
now consider to be rational. This was because in these environments people’s 
time horizon was short (i.e. life expectancy was short) and the future was unreli-
able, so that there was not any strong selective pressure favouring the emergence 
of a propensity to defer the consumption of the goods with a view to increas-
ing their quantity in the future. In sum, Thesis 3 of the Darwinian view of hu-
man nature is polemical to the view (especially widespread among economists) 
that human beings are perfectly rational. It may also be noted that Thesis 2 and 
Thesis 3, taken jointly, stand in opposition to the view of human being as homo 
oeconomicus, i.e. rational egoist.
Controversies surrounding the Darwinian view of human nature
An obvious problem with the three theses of the Darwinian view of human 
nature is that they are not suffi ciently precise and thereby admit various inter-
pretations. In this section I shall present the main controversies connected with 
each of these theses and two main interpretations of each of them. 
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Thesis 1
The claim that the human mind is modular and that its modules have been 
produced by natural selection is very plausible. Indeed, it seems that the best 
way of coping with the problems encountered by our ancestors in ancestral en-
vironments (and thereby the way to have the highest likelihood of having been 
preserved by natural selection) was not through some general, all-purpose, ab-
stract problem-solving mechanism, but through a set of discrete and functionally 
specialized problem-solving mechanisms (they would function faster and more 
effectively than the general mechanism in confrontation with concrete problems). 
However, this view of the human mind is unclear in three main points. Firstly, 
there is no consensus among evolutionary biologists regarding the quantity of 
psychological modules in the brain – as yet no fully plausible taxonomy of these 
modules has been provided. Secondly, it is not clear how fl exible these psycho-
logical modules are (for example, evolutionary psychologists do not make clear 
to what extent male sexual jealousy – one of those modules – can be ‘reduced’ by 
social learning). Thirdly, it is not clear whether the human mind is composed of 
only discrete and functionally specialized problem-solving mechanisms or wheth-
er it also contains some general, all-purpose, abstract problem-solving mecha-
nism which extracts and combines information from different modules and deals 
with new adaptive problems. Taking into account these three points, we obtain 
two versions of Thesis 1:
Theses 1a: The human mind is composed of only domain-specifi c modules. 
These modules are numerous and rigid in their functioning, i.e. they can be modi-
fi ed by social learning to a small degree.
Thesis 1b: The human mind contains not only domain-specifi c modules but 
also a domain-general mechanism. These domain-specifi c modules are not nu-
merous and are fl exible in their functioning, i.e. they can be modifi ed by social 
learning to a large degree.
As can easily be observed, Thesis 1 in its variant 1b becomes closer to the view 
of human nature as a blank slate.
Thesis 2
The view of morality as an extension of social instincts says only that we are 
moral by nature, i.e. that we are not egoistic or malicious or in some other way 
antisocial; it does not make precise what the content of our natural moral disposi-
tions are. Accordingly, it is compatible with various, more specifi c views of human 
morality. Before I present two main views of this kind, I shall defi ne three forms 
of altruism which I shall employ in this presentation, namely, kin altruism, recip-
rocal altruism and pure altruism. In the case of kin altruism an agent sustains 
high costs for the good of a relative without expecting the return of these costs in 
the future. In the case of reciprocal altruism, an agent sustains high costs for the 
good of an unrelated person expecting the return of these costs in the future. It 
should be noted that reciprocally altruistic acts driven are rather peculiar forms 
of acts: they are neither truly egoistic, because they involve sustaining some costs 
for other persons, nor truly altruistic, because they are not motivated by the con-
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cern with the well-being of the other persons). In the case of pure altruism, an 
agent sustains high costs for the good of an unrelated person without expecting 
the return of these costs in the future. Now, relying on these three forms of altru-
ism, one can distinguish two varieties of the view of morality as an extension of 
social instincts. The fi rst variety says that human beings are narrowly altruistic, 
that is, they tend to manifest in many circumstances kin altruism and reciprocal 
altruism. The second variety says that human beings are genuinely moral, that 
is, they tend they tend to manifest in many circumstances kin altruism, recipro-
cal altruism and pure altruism. It is clear that evolutionary biology supports at 
least the view that human beings are narrowly altruistic. However, it is not clear 
whether it supports the second – more optimistic – picture of human morality. 
Most evolutionary biologists claim that evolution has not endowed us with the 
tendency to engage in purely altruistic acts: they maintain that such acts are just 
the maladaptive side-effects of kin altruism and reciprocal altruism. However, 
some scholars defend the claim that evolution has endowed us with such a ten-
dency. They argue either that such a tendency is a product of sexual selection or 
that it is a product of group selection. According to the former explanation, the 
tendency to undertake purely altruistic acts may have evolved, even though it 
decreased the probability of survival of those who manifested it, if this tendency 
was for some reason attractive for the opposite sex and thereby increased the 
probability of mating and reproductive success. According to the latter explana-
tion, genetic group selection may have favoured the tendency to undertake purely 
altruistic acts, the reason being that groups with many individuals endowed with 
this tendency and thereby inclined to sacrifi ce themselves for the group to which 
they belong are likely to fare better than and win over groups with individuals 
endowed only with the tendency to display kin altruism and reciprocal altruism. 
In sum, evolutionary biology does not say clearly if we are only kin and reciprocal 
altruists, or also pure altruists. Accordingly, we obtain two variants of Thesis 2:
Thesis 2a: Human beings are narrowly altruistic.
Thesis 2b: Human beings are genuinely moral.
Thesis 3
Evolutionary biology supports the view that human beings will systematically 
deviate from the requirements of perfect rationality. However, it is diffi cult to say 
how large deviations from these requirements human beings should be expected 
(in the light of evolutionary biology) to manifest. The diffi culty stems from the 
fact that, on the one hand, the aforementioned general insights of evolutionary 
biology into human rationality support the view that human beings are imper-
fectly rational, but, on the other, evolutionary biology (especially, evolutionary 
psychology) has led to the reinterpretation of some psychological experiments 
purportedly demonstrating human imperfect rationality. A classic example is the 
Wason selection task, which is aimed at testing our understanding of the logical 
properties of sentences having the form of an implication. It has turned out that 
people have problems providing correct answers to the task if the implication has 
the form of a descriptive sentence, but they cope well with the task if the implica-
tion has the form of a norm regulating social exchange. More generally, evolution-
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ary analysis has shown that various purported violations of the requirements of 
rationality are often not the effects of our cognitive defects and thereby should 
not be construed as attesting to human imperfect rationality. After all, they can 
often be interpreted as manifestations of the tendency of the human mind to use 
rational ‘mental shortcuts’ for making decisions (e.g. various heuristics) or as the 
effects of confronting subjects with artifi cial situations which they can never en-
counter in real life or with non-artifi cial situations but nonetheless having little 
signifi cance for their survival and reproduction. Accordingly, many evolutionary 
theorists defend the view that human beings are ‘ecologically rational,’ that is, 
the view that human beings act rationally in practical situations, especially those 
situations which resemble contexts which could have been encountered in ances-
tral environments. The above remarks show that the evolutionary view of human 
rationality is more complex and less clear than Thesis 3 may suggest. Taking 
into account these remarks, it seems that one can distinguish two variants of 
this thesis:
Thesis 3a: Human beings are imperfectly rationally and their deviations from 
perfect rationality are large.
Thesis 3b: Human beings are imperfectly rationally but their deviations from 
perfect rationality are small (when viewed from the evolutionary perspective, many 
violations of perfect rationality prove to be apparent rather than real).
In sum, recent developments in the biological sciences have taught us that the 
human mind is not a blank slate, that human morality is embedded in our na-
ture and that our rationality is not perfect. These general theses constitute what 
I have called ‘the Darwinian view of human nature.’ Unfortunately, the biologi-
cal sciences, at the present stage of their development, cannot help in deciding 
unequivocally which of the presented interpretations of these theses are correct: 
they seem to admit of all these interpretations. Thus, the Darwinian view of 
human nature is still not fully determinate. Once can hope that this situation 
will change in the future as a result of the progress in the biological sciences. It 
seems, though, that even in their general form these theses are illuminating and 
can be regarded as providing the foundations of a solid view of human nature.
